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moments have changed State. To achieve this, I rely on the 9/11 Commission Report, congressional hearings,
interviews, and memoirs of relevant actors. Viewing State’s response to 9/11 in these two contexts, I argue
that while the agency has improved its public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world and its approach to
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Abstract 
 
When and under what circumstances does a bureaucracy implement reforms? What can inhibit it 
from doing so? This thesis explores these questions through the particular lens of the State 
Department and the terrorist attacks carried out by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. I examine 
State Department reform in two capacities: first, how State responded to Al Qaeda attacks 
leading up to 9/11, and second, how prior historical watershed moments have changed State. To 
achieve this, I rely on the 9/11 Commission Report, congressional hearings, interviews, and 
memoirs of relevant actors. Viewing State’s response to 9/11 in these two contexts, I argue that 
while the agency has improved its public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world and its approach 
to counterterrorism, an absence of outside pressure from commissions and a lack of funding has 
prevented the department from making dramatic changes to the bureaucratic structure. This, in 
turn, has negative consequences for how diplomats carry out their missions in a technologically 
sophisticated and multipolar world. 
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My generation sees September 11, 2001 as the day that changed everything. My thesis asks: what 
if it didn’t? What if the enormous and complex federal structure we’ve created is so large and 
entrenched that it resists change, even when faced with an emergency? It’s a question worth 
pondering again and again. 
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“The nightmare of the modern state is the hugeness of the bureaucracy, and the problem is how 
to get coherence and design in it.” — Henry Kissinger, 1970 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Each day, more than 5,000 people arrive to work in the State Department’s main building 
in Foggy Bottom. Harnessing this large group’s potential is paramount: the foreign policy of the 
United States depends on it. For decades, scholars and oversight commissions identified the 
bureaucratic maladies that plague the Foggy Bottom operation. On September 11, 2001, the State 
Department — like the rest of the country — was put to the test. The shocking and tragic events 
of that day called on government to rise to the occasion and respond to an international crisis. 
Through internal committees, congressional hearings, and the 9/11 Commission, State has been 
subject to numerous evaluations of its reaction to the events of September 11th. Yet many of 
those oversight organizations focused on the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) failures. Later, 
Washington’s attention turned to mobilizing the Department of Defense for the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
The assessments of the State Department largely fell by the wayside and did not garner as 
much attention as they could have. By examining State’s internal response, strategists can find 
areas for improvements, both within the State Department and within executive bureaucracies 
more broadly. From a scholarship perspective, this paper can restart an important discussion 
about an organization rooted in the Cold War that is now faced with transnational problems of 
enormous scope. The lessons of September 11th permeate every discussion in Washington, either 
obviously or more subtly, and studying how those lessons are applied is integral to improving 
their response to future crises. 
This thesis will explore whether the State Department has used the lessons from 9/11 to 
restructure its operation, and if not, what prevented it from doing so. What kind of impetus does 
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it take to make this large organization change? Recent political science literature in the subfield 
of bureaucratic analysis focuses on domestic policy bureaucracies, not on the State Department 
or global threats like terrorism. This paper seeks to fill this void in the academic and policy 
conversation by investigating the ability of the State Department to respond to international 
crises. To achieve this, I examine the State Department’s response to 9/11, particularly its 
response to Al Qaeda’s terrorist operations. As the best-case scenario for catalyzing 
organizational change, 9/11 is a strong case study for revealing the insurmountable or near-
insurmountable obstacles that exist in the federal system. Ten years after those horrific events, 
sufficient time has passed to gain perspective and critically examine the State Department’s role. 
The analytical component of this thesis is divided into two sections: what the State 
Department and other agencies knew and did before 9/11, and then the response to 9/11. The first 
part provides context and demonstrates the pattern of resistance to change even after the threat of 
terrorism, in general, and Al Qaeda, in particular, had become apparent. This portion draws 
heavily on the 9/11 Commission Report, as well as the commission’s hearings and the 
autobiographies of relevant actors. The goal is not to place blame on the Clinton White House or 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, but rather to assess how the federal system missed the red 
flags regarding Al Qaeda. The second part comprises the bulk of the analysis and the evidence 
for the assertion that more substantial reforms are necessary. Close scrutiny reveals that while 
many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations were enacted, many of those 
recommendations did not pertain to State. As a result of congressional hearings and a new 
agenda set by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton through the 21st Century Statecraft initiative and 
the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, State engaged in some minor 
restructuring and put forth new programs. The department as a whole, however, did not undergo 
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dramatic changes the way it did after World War II or the Cold War. Expert interviews, an 
assessment of the post-9/11 changes, and an analysis of State’s budget in the 2000s shed light on 
why the agency’s response to the largest terrorist attack in history was unduly limited in scope.1 
  
                                                
1 Active employees of the State Department cannot grant interviews without the consent and approval of the Public 
Affairs bureau. As such, the people interviewed for this thesis are those who previously worked for State, consulted 
for State in some capacity, or who currently study the operations of the State Department from an academic 
perspective. 
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Chapter 2: State’s Long History 
The Department of State is the nation’s oldest federal agency. State’s history begins in 
1775, when the Continental Congress chose a Committee of Secret Correspondence to negotiate 
with France. In 1781, Congress approved a formal plan of organization for what would become 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. The plan included a secretary with a $4,000 annual salary, a 
first under secretary, a second under secretary, two clerks, and a translator.2 President George 
Washington signed the bill on July 27, 1789, thereby creating the country’s first executive 
department. When several domestic tasks were assigned to the original Department of Foreign 
Affairs — keeping records and seals, as well as publishing acts of Congress and treaties — its 
name was changed to the Department of State.3 (Over the years, State has been responsible for 
tasks as varied as taking the census and management of the mint, but most of those jobs have 
subsequently been reassigned to domestic-focused agencies.) In 1886, Congress approved an act 
declaring that in the event of death, removal, or resignation of both the President and the Vice 
President, the next in line for succession would be the Secretary of State, which established “the 
primacy of the Department of State over the other departments.”4 The Presidential Succession 
Act of 1947 has since placed the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate ahead of the Secretary of State, but the Secretary of State retains symbolic primacy within 
the Cabinet. 
Out of necessity, the State Department began expanding, though at a slow pace. In 1800, 
State employed a total of ten men; by 1820, it increased to fifteen.5 The first major 
reorganization occurred in 1870, when Secretary Hamilton Fish created the regional bureaus, a 
                                                
2 Graham Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 
18. 
3 Ibid., p. 19. 
4 Ibid., p. 20. 
5 Ibid., p. 21. 
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process that was solidified by Secretary Philander Knox prior to World War I.6 At the outbreak 
of the Great War, the department consisted of just 210 people. Assistant Secretary of State Alvey 
Adee joked that he carried “the whole machinery of foreign policy under his hat.”7 World War I 
revealed the need for a substantial increase in employees, so the State Department took on more 
staff. By the time President Franklin Roosevelt came into office in 1932, State employed 800 
people, but that still proved insufficient.8  
Much-needed growth took place between 1944 and 1950, primarily under the leadership 
of Secretaries of State Edward Stettinius, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson (these changes 
are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5). The turning point for reforms occurred as a result of 
the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government of 
1947, which highlighted the burdens on the Department of State. At this point, the agency took 
on the form that people recognize today: it relocated to its current home in Foggy Bottom, took 
on the responsibility of explaining American foreign policy to both foreign and domestic 
audiences, and divided its several thousand employees between research and policy guidance.9 
At this stage, State employed over 13,000 people domestically and abroad.10 The rapid growth 
and expansion of duties prompted scholars to study the operation in Foggy Bottom. Through the 
1960s and 1970s, academics and think tanks began critically examining the State Department 
and its bureaucratic structure. 
  
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Qtd. on Stuart, American Diplomatic, p. 21. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 22-3. 
10 Donald Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State 
Department (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 16. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 In his Theory of Public Bureaucracy, Harvard sociologist Donald Warwick provided an 
insightful critique of the State Department based on bureaucratic theory. He opened with 
sociologist Max Weber’s defining characteristics of a bureaucracy: hierarchical structure with 
top-down authority; a series of offices with assigned duties; formal rules governing behavior; 
and technically qualified personnel employed on a career basis. Essentially, Weber sought “a 
highly efficient means of harnessing individuals to organizational ends.”11 Yet Warwick’s 
discussion was not all theoretical; his motivation for writing the book was that “the department 
in the 1960s was a constant target of criticism for its rigidity and inaction.”12 Warwick cites three 
crucial differences between State and other agencies: (1) separation of policy formulation from 
administration, (2) separation of implementation from both policy formulation and 
administration, and (3) use of the administrative sector of one department to backstop the 
operations of another.13 The State Department also exists within the complex environment of the 
federal government, where it responds to higher authorities in Congress and the White House, 
clientele groups, international allies in particular debates, and adversaries.14 
 Two other scholars wrote similar critiques in the early 1970s. I.M. Destler’s seminal text, 
Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy, criticized how the State Department has not been 
able to meet the president’s foreign policy needs. Francis Rourke’s Bureaucracy and Foreign 
Policy viewed the State Department through the lens of policy failures in relation to the Cold 
War and the Vietnam War. Taken together, these works form the backbone of bureaucratic 
                                                
11 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
12 Ibid., p. 9. 
13 Ibid., p. 87. 
14 Ibid., p. 62. 
 11  
theory as it applies to American foreign policy. Warwick’s, Destler’s, and Rourke’s criticisms all 
fall under the following five broad categories: 
(i) Territorialism 
Inevitably, a bureau will support missions or policies that allow it to display its skills.15 
Furthermore, because no one in a large organization is quite sure what constitutes a policy or 
where a given policy originates, everyone involved wishes to be consulted. Even on a relatively 
minor issue, as many as fifteen different subunits may have to sign off on the relevant cable or 
memorandum.16 A 1966 White House staff paper explained the complicated nature of issue 
ownership: 
The State Department is not an organization in the usual sense. It is a 
constellation of small power centers — some moving, some standing still, some 
competing, some hiding, some growing, some decaying, a few coalescing, but 
more breaking apart into smaller fragments which soon develop all the organs and 
physiology of their parents.17 
 
This led Warwick to conclude, “Beneath the formal allocation of authority in State is an intricate 
web of conflicts, rivalries, and alliances.”18 Untangling the web is crucial to enacting meaningful 
reforms. 
(ii) Loyalties and Asymmetric Information 
State Department bureaucrats all have different allegiances. Political appointees owe their 
job to the President and the Secretary of State. Career diplomats, by contrast, must think of their 
long-term trajectory within the department. For them, burning bridges within their bureau could 
be disadvantageous down the road. In 1968, James Thomson critiqued the State Department’s 
“curator mentality” — “a career orientation which makes the preservation of past policy the 
                                                
15 Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 44. 
16 Warwick, p. 88. 
17 Qtd. on I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational 
Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 160. 
18 Warwick, p. 29. 
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primary responsibility of the bureaucrat rather than the initiation of new ideas.”19 Most 
significantly, bureaucrats are all privy to a varying amount of information and differing 
pressures: “Each must maintain the loyalty of a different group of subordinates, the respect of a 
different group of peers, the confidence of a different boss.”20 Asymmetrical access to cables, 
emails, or roundtable discussions means actors come into working groups with varying amounts 
of information.  
(iii) Hierarchical Rigidity 
The aforementioned bureaucratic pressures create a specific kind of work environment. 
Presidential power scholar Richard Neustadt famously wrote, “Initiatives, once taken, must be 
followed through with imagination and flexibility, and the bureaucracy has neither.”21 This is not 
to suggest that no State Department policymakers ever construct innovative or path-breaking 
solutions to the problems they face. Rather, the day-to-day pressures of operating in a rigid 
hierarchy often unintentionally obstruct creative thinking. Bureaucrats encounter significant 
barriers to dissent, as they recognize how detrimental it can be to argue against one’s boss or 
coworker.22 (This is true not only at the State Department but in all large organizations, both in 
the public and private sectors.) Security rules further reinforce the hierarchy, as deliberate or 
accidental leaks of classified information cannot be tolerated. Warwick explains, “The 
combination of a heavy message volume, a high degree of centralization, and tight security 
procedures sets the stage for the elongation of hierarchy and the proliferation of rules.”23 
 
 
                                                
19 Rourke, p. 26. 
20 Destler, p. 57. 
21 Qtd. on Rourke, p. 58. 
22 Destler, p. 292. 
23 Warwick, p. 123. 
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(iv) Inertia 
Perhaps the greatest consequence of a massive organization with a strict hierarchy is 
bureaucratic inertia. Presidential advisor Ted Sorensen once said President John F. Kennedy “felt 
that [State] too often seemed to have a built-in inertia which deadened initiative and that its 
tendency toward excessive delay obscured determination. It spoke with too many voices and too 
little vigor.”24 On the one hand, rules and structure play an important role in ensuring employees 
of the federal government adhere to policies. Bureaucratic routines make employees behave in a 
predictable manner that suits organizational goals rather than personal inclinations. On the other 
hand, routines are difficult to start and then, once begun, equally difficult to stop. Habits are also 
tough to break.25 Bureaucratic inertia can turn a minor glitch into a major crisis. Key actors 
within the chain can also effectively veto a policy simply by doing nothing, thereby de facto 
exerting much more power than they were ever delegated.26 Internal pressures — including the 
discontinuity of leadership, resistance from career employees, organizational conflicts, and 
managerial philosophy — further impede bureaucratic change.27 
(v) Incomplete Control 
In the past half-century, the State Department has lost its monopoly on foreign affairs. 
Once the leading agency within the executive branch, State now shares its powers with a number 
of other organizations. The National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA, the National Security 
Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In varying ways, each of those bodies has a voice in how 
America conducts its foreign policy. As Rourke explains, “Bureaucrats do not wield an exclusive 
                                                
24 Qtd. on Destler, p. 155. 
25 Rourke, p. 49-50. 
26 Ibid., p. 60. 
27 Warwick, p. 197. 
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or monopolistic kind of authority in foreign affairs.”28 Ultimately, the State Department only 
counsels the president. As the nation’s Diplomat-in-Chief, the president chooses whether to 
make foreign affairs a priority and whether to adhere to State’s recommendations. President 
Richard Nixon, for example, famously operated outside of traditional diplomatic norms and 
relied on National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his back-channel deals to pursue 
détente. Today, Foggy Bottom employees exist in an environment influenced by dozens of 
factors, including public opinion and whether the president chooses to prioritize foreign affairs. 
Bureaucrats are therefore never fully in control of the policies they shape. 
The scholarly literature identifies one more significant trait that is unique to the State 
Department: the role of regional bureaus. The department is divided into regional and functional 
offices. The six regional bureaus — African, European and Eurasian, East Asian and Pacific, 
Near Eastern, South and Central Asian, and Western Hemisphere Affairs — all report up to the 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Each regional bureau is comprised of desk officers with 
local expertise about a country, and they guide the department on bilateral relationships. The 
functional bureaus deal with the plethora of issues that transcend borders, everything from civil 
rights and the environment to nuclear nonproliferation and war crimes. In theory, this means that 
there could be a counterterrorism officer sitting in the African Affairs bureau and an African 
expert in the counterterrorism office. The question then arises, which of these two people has the 
final say on policy?  
The regional bureaus have a longer history in the department, because America has been 
engaging in bilateral diplomacy since the country’s founding. As State expanded in size, 
Secretaries of State wanted to make sure that detailed, analytical information about each country 
was making its way up the Foggy Bottom food chain: 
                                                
28 Rourke, p. 15. 
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An important feature of this establishment of offices in control of certain 
geographical areas and the elimination of the political advisers was its tendency to 
centralize policy making closer to the country desks where the expert might be 
expected to have a greater influence. At the same time the geographical divisions 
were increased in number so that where formerly there were only four such 
divisions, the four offices which took their place were divided into nineteen 
divisions, which made much greater specialization possible.”29 
 
The regional bureaus possess other advantages as well. They are often staffed by Foreign Service 
Officers and therefore control overseas assignments, which are the reward mechanisms in the 
State Department system. Career diplomats switch posts every two or three years, and each actor 
hopes to win the ultimate prize of an attractive assignment. Finally, the majority of ambassadors 
answer to regional bureaus, giving regional assistant secretaries more leverage in high-level 
discussions. As a result, “the functional bureaus regard their work as no less important, but suffer 
from second-class status.”30 In a Foreign Policy article about State Department reform, public 
diplomacy scholar Matthew Armstrong advised Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to restructure 
the focus from countries to regions, breaking the chain of bureaus being designed primarily to 
oversee a network of embassies.31 To date, this kind of change has not been implemented, and 
the six regional bureaus continue to operate largely in the same way they have for decades. 
 Scholars note that because of structural flaws, the department may attract a 
disproportionate and unfair share of blame from other Washington operatives. Rourke claims 
government bureaucracy has become “a device by which blame for failures in policy can be 
shifted from political to administrative elites — from a party that can do no wrong to a 
bureaucracy that is often made to seem as though it can do no right.”32 After his departure from 
public life, historian and presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. famously held the State 
                                                
29 Stuart, p. 391. 
30 Warwick, p. 33. 
31 Matthew Armstrong, “Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom,” Foreign Policy, September 11, 2009, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/ 11/hitting_bottom_in_foggy_bottom. 
32 Rourke, p. 6. 
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Department and the CIA responsible for the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy blunders. 
John Kenneth Galbraith also scapegoated the bureaucratic system, linking its missteps to 
American involvement in the Vietnam War.33 Rourke notes that a single agency is rarely 
responsible for an entire administration’s success or failure in a given area. 
 Others prove less sympathetic than Rourke. Forty years ago, in the inaugural issue of 
Foreign Policy, legendary diplomat Richard Holbrooke wrote a feature entitled, “The Machine 
That Fails.” As a State Department official, he explained that he lived with the consequences of 
the department’s structural flaws: “I feel its shortcomings with a special keenness. It is hard to 
decide whether to play the drama as tragedy, comedy, or simply theater of the absurd.”34 For 
Holbrooke, size was the biggest issue — both in the number of staff employed and, the even 
more serious problem, the multiplicity of chains of command: 
A desk officer in State has recently calculated that while in theory he is the focal 
point of all Washington efforts concerning ‘his’ country, in fact there are 16 
people working on the country in Washington, in different chains of command. 
They are receiving information directly from the Americans in the country 
through up to nine different channels. No one sees all the communications in 
every channel. Through great effort the desk officer has come to know all the 
other officers, but, he points out, they change regularly (himself included); 
someone is always out of town or sick; and most importantly, each one has his 
own boss, who can determine his future career; each one has his own set of 
priority projects and problems.35 
 
The consequences of growing too large, Holbrooke argued, are profound. He developed what 
could be termed a law of bureaucracies in crisis: “The chances of catastrophe grow as 
organizations grow in number and in size, and as internal communications become more time-
consuming and less intelligible.”36 He concluded that the president must make reform a priority, 
                                                
33 Ibid., p. 5-6. 
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as the White House would most immediately benefit from a more streamlined foreign-policy 
apparatus. Yet because more urgent problems often arise, presidential advisors tend to put 
tedious reform projects on the back burner. As a result, Holbrooke wrote, the foreign policy 
structure has become dysfunctional.37 Two generations later, one could argue that this is still the 
case. 
 Though many political scientists have made valuable contributions to the field of 
bureaucratic theory, not much has been written on practical implications for bureaucracies in 
times of turmoil. In 1999, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow updated Allison’s groundbreaking 
1971 book, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. The analysis seeks to 
explain the thirteen-day event from both a practical and a theoretical angle, drawing comparisons 
to other decision-making processes throughout the 20th century. Allison critiques the notion that 
one individual, often the president, drives decisions in a crisis: “It obscures the persistently 
neglected fact of government: the ‘decision maker’ of national policy is obviously not one 
calculating individual but is rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors.”38  
Allison questions the classic Rational Actor Model, replacing it with the Organizational 
Behavior Model and the Governmental Politics Model. He suggests that foreign policy is like a 
chess game in which multiple actors move the chess pieces according to standard operating 
procedures and sometimes according to distinctive objectives.39 He notes that while critics are 
often quick to dismiss rigid routines, “their value is clearest to those who have actually had to get 
something done.”40 Still, procedures and plans do not necessarily provide adequate guidance in 
the event of a disaster: “Long-range planning tends to become institutionalized (in order to 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (London: 
Longman, 1999), p. 3. 
39 Ibid., p. 6-7. 
40 Ibid., p. 152. 
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provide a proper gesture in that direction) and then disregarded.”41 Finally, Allison agrees with 
Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which contends that in groups of three or more, some 
people’s opinions or preferences will be distorted or even disregarded.42 
In the 21st century, political scientist Donald Kettl has produced the most significant work 
on bureaucratic crises. His two recent books, The Next Government of the United States: Why 
Our Institutions Fail Us and How to Fix Them, and System Under Stress: Homeland Security 
and American Politics, fill important gaps in recent discussions. Kettl traces the design of 
modern government bureaucracy to President Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive movement. 
The Progressives borrowed best practices from the private sector and created an operation with 
limited goals and sufficient means to achieve them. If the system fails, they argued, someone 
would “crawl inside the machine and tinker with the parts — restructure, reorganize, and 
reconfigure.”43 This leaves open the question of responsibility: who would undertake the 
unpleasant and often inglorious work of fixing the problems? Kettl further argues, “It is 
becoming increasingly hard for government to solve problems because the problems themselves 
confound the boundaries created to solve them. In fact, it is no longer possible to assign 
responsibility for any fundamental problem to a single government agency.”44  
Indeed, in a complex system where multiple agencies are involved in each decision, a 
quick fix is rarely sufficient. While the number of problems grows, the willingness to take 
responsibility appears to be waning. For politicians, “good management is not necessarily good 
politics.”45 Congressmen and women remain keenly aware that their next reelection bid looms on 
                                                
41 Ibid., p. 181. 
42 Ibid., p. 273. 
43 Donald Kettl, The Next Government of the United States: Why Our Institutions Fail Us and How to Fix 
Them (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), p. 110. 
44 Ibid., p. 34. 
45 Ibid., p. 91. 
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the horizon. 46 Tangible results in areas like defense spending, therefore, take priority over 
diplomacy, which can take years to bear fruit. Congress’s appreciation for results over structure 
can squander or derail reform efforts. Kettl’s work, though an important update to the literature 
of the 1970s, centers on issues of homeland security, such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s response to Hurricane Katrina. His domestic policy scholarship therefore 
paves the way for a similar analysis of the foreign policy realm. 
None of the recent literature — by Allison, Kettl, or any other political scientist —
 focuses specifically on the State Department and transnational threats like terrorism. However, 
the older literature’s conclusions still apply: territorialism, asymmetric information access, 
hierarchical rigidity, bureaucratic inertia, and incomplete control continue to exist at the State 
Department and other agencies. The literature provides a framework in which to pose the central 
question: what circumstances would motivate change in such a system? In this context, the 
subsequent section examines the warning signs that existed prior to 9/11 and why terrorist 
attacks in the 1990s were insufficient to trigger reforms. 
  
                                                
46 Ibid., p. 95. 
 20  
Chapter 4: Prelude to Disaster 
 The road to 9/11 began long before that clear September morning. Through its interviews 
and investigative report, the 9/11 Commission outlined the steps that brought the United States 
and the world to that day. The federal government, and in particular the State Department, first 
started taking the threat of terrorism seriously in the 1970s. In 1972, President Nixon created the 
Office for Combatting Terrorism after the attacks at the Munich Olympics. However, the Iran 
hostage crisis of 1979-1981 “ended the State Department leadership in counterterrorism,” as the 
White House took the reins on this issue.47 Over the coming decades, different agencies would 
take ownership over different aspects of the terrorism threat. In the 1980s, State “continued to be 
dominated by regional bureaus for which terrorism was not a first-order concern.”48 The irony in 
this fact is that a wealthy Saudi man, Osama Bin Laden, founded the organization called Al 
Qaeda in 1988 to pursue global jihad.49 
 The end of the Cold War shook up the foreign policy community and realigned the 
priorities in Washington. Terrorism could have risen to the top of the agenda, but for a variety of 
reasons, explained below, this was not the case. National security expenditure reductions after 
the Cold War resulted in budget cuts in intelligence programs from 1990 to 1996. The budget 
then effectively stayed flat for the remainder of the decade.50 At the same time, “the CIA […] 
needed significant change in order to get maximum effect in counterterrorism.”51 Intelligence on 
Al Qaeda would fall through the cracks or, even if taken seriously by one agency, would be 
ignored by another. Over the course of a decade, no central coordinator was connecting the dots. 
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(A) 1993 World Trade Center Bombing 
The first shock to the system came with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This 
event seems like a lost opportunity only in hindsight. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, 
the successful investigative and prosecutorial effort following the attack gave a false impression 
of American preparedness: “The trials did not bring the Bin Laden network to the attention of the 
public and policymakers.”52 State’s South Asia bureau grew interested in Bin Laden several 
years later when he moved to Afghanistan in May 1996, but the bureau did not act on this 
interest: “At the time, as one diplomat told us, South Asia was seen in the department and the 
government generally as a low priority. […] With regard to Afghanistan, another diplomat said, 
the United States at the time had ‘no policy.’”53 
 Experts and reports explained the threat of terrorism clearly in the 1990s. A 1995 
National Intelligence Estimate report described terrorists as “transient groups of individuals” 
with “loose affiliates” who operate “outside traditional circles but have access to a worldwide 
network of training facilities and safe havens.”54 Policymakers, in turn, understood the threat but 
not the threat level: “The U.S. government took the threat seriously, but not in the sense of 
mustering anything like the kind of effort that would be gathered to confront an enemy of the 
first, second, or even third rank.”55 Structural challenges persisted within the State Department 
and the executive branch at large. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) were in charge of domestic terrorism, while the CIA and State Department 
dealt with terror abroad.56 Under President Bill Clinton, “the lead U.S. agencies each pursued 
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their own efforts against Bin Laden.”57 These gaps reflect how few lessons the federal agencies 
gleaned from the 1993 attack. 
(B) 1998 Embassy Bombings 
At 10:30 a.m. on August 7, 1998, trucks armed with bombs drove up to the American 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attack in Nairobi killed twelve 
Americans and 201 others. Eleven more people died in Dar es Salaam.58 The State Department 
took the attacks extremely seriously. In the years since, the department has reevaluated its 
diplomatic security procedures for embassies and undertaken countless new safety precautions 
— a significant step in the right direction. Yet in many ways, the Clinton administration’s 
approach to Al Qaeda did not change. Policymakers reasoned:  
Even after the embassy attacks, Bin Laden had been responsible for the deaths of 
fewer than 50 Americans, most of them overseas. An NSC staffer working for 
Richard Clarke told [the 9/11 Commission] the threat was seen as one that could 
cause hundreds of casualties, not thousands. Even officials who acknowledge a 
vital threat intellectually may not be ready to act on such beliefs at great cost or at 
high risk.59  
 
Furthermore, terrorism was still not a top diplomatic priority. One of the counterterrorism 
coordinators under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the 9/11 Commission “his job was 
seen as a minor one within the department.”60 
After the embassy bombings, two commissions formed: the Crowe Panel, mandated by 
the 1986 Diplomatic Security Act, and the Bremer Commission, which broadly sought to 
reevaluate federal counterterrorism policies. The Crowe Panel issued a critical report that 
initially resulted in few policy changes, but Navy Admiral William Crowe campaigned for 
further reforms. The government ultimately followed the Crowe Panel’s recommendations and 
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spent more than $14 billion on new embassy security in the decade following the attacks.61 The 
money went toward securing existing facilities, as well as building eight to ten new diplomatic 
buildings annually to replace old structures with insufficient security protection.62 
By contrast, the Bremer Commission’s recommendations were largely ignored. The 
committee, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, interviewed a wide range of government 
officials and think tanks fellows, from criminal investigators at the DOJ to members of the 
counterterrorism bureau at the State Department. Its recommendations included bolstering 
funding for counterterrorism efforts, vigorously targeting states that support terrorism, namely 
Afghanistan, and creating a comprehensive plan for interagency information and fund sharing.63 
In defining the terrorist threat, the report specifically named Bin Laden and cited that the World 
Trade Center bombing killed six and wounded a thousand people, “but the terrorists’ goal was to 
topple the twin towers.”64 Experts recognized the trend toward higher casualties and the ever-
increasing fanatical hatred of the United States among groups like Al Qaeda. The Bremer 
Commission highlighted bureaucratic obstacles and how “U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 
communities lack the ability to prioritize, translate, and understand in a timely fashion all of the 
information to which they have access.”65 The concerns regarding terrorist visas and 
designations of foreign terrorist groups — issues that came under close scrutiny in the wake of 
9/11 — are presciently detailed in the 2000 report.66 This further reinforces the notion that the 
federal government, both at the highest levels of the Cabinet and at the bottom of the 
bureaucratic chains, understood the threat and the need for reform prior to the 9/11 attacks. 
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 According to Richard Betts, a member of the Bremer Commission and a Council on 
Foreign Relations senior fellow for National Security Studies, the commission’s 
recommendations were largely overlooked. He explains, “They were mostly ignored, and that's 
what happens with most commissions. 9/11 was an exception. With our commission, a lot of the 
suggestions were discussed and tossed around but nothing much happened.” Betts says this is not 
an uncommon phenomenon in Washington. Oftentimes, commissions are formed to “pass off a 
difficult or sensitive issue that politicians can’t reach agreement on,” and those disagreements 
then mean that a commission’s recommendations face obstacles in Congress. The default option 
politically is “not to act rather than to act.”67 
Jordan Tama, a fellow of the Truman National Security Project, studies the effectiveness 
of national security commissions. He attributes the Bremer Commission’s failure to several 
factors. First, its report came out between crises, two years after the embassy bombings, but 
before the U.S.S. Cole and September 11th attacks. Second, the commission’s scope was too 
general, aiming to recommend changes to the CIA, Defense, State, and the DOJ. Finally, the 
Clinton White House saw the report as biased toward the Republican agenda, which meant the 
recommendations never gained momentum. After 9/11, policymakers took a second look at the 
Bremer report and enacted some of the proposals, but this did not alter the course of history in 
the crucial months preceding the Twin Tower attacks.68 
(C) 2000 U.S.S. Cole Bombing 
On October 12, 2000, in the last days of the Clinton administration, Al Qaeda struck the 
United States Naval destroyer U.S.S. Cole while it was refueling in a Yemini port. The attack 
resulted in 17 American deaths and 39 injuries. The following summer, Al Qaeda would use 
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footage of the explosion in a propaganda video, mere months before 9/11. In response to the 
bombing, President Clinton did not issue a statement of blame: “Some of Secretary Albright’s 
advisers warned her at the time to be sure the evidence conclusively linked Bin Laden to the 
Cole before considering any response, especially a military one, because such action might 
inflame the Islamic world and increase support for the Taliban.”69 Executive agencies only 
offered preliminary judgments and intelligence, and as such, Bin Laden would not be publicly 
blamed for the Cole until after the 9/11 attacks. 
In her testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Albright spoke about her decisions as 
Secretary of State:  
Although the focus of our anti-terrorism efforts throughout 1999 and 2000 was 
squarely on al-Qaeda and other groups with connections to Osama bin Laden, we 
did not always stress this publicly. […] Our counter-terrorism experts urged us in 
our public statements not to single him out, build him up or refer to the vastness 
of his operations. As a result, when I testified before Congress and made speeches 
about terror, I tended to talk in general terms and minimized specific mentions of 
Bin Laden.70  
 
Furthermore, Secretary Albright emphasized that behind the scenes, the Clinton White House 
discussed retaliation but that its hands were tied: “From the time of the Africa embassy 
bombings until the day the Clinton administration left office, the president was prepared to order 
military action to capture or kill bin Laden.”71 She said that if President Clinton had received 
conclusive predictive intelligence, he would likely have issued an attack. 
Speaking with the benefit of hindsight, Secretary Albright gave the 9/11 Commission a 
dozen different recommendations in her testimony. The first was the “comprehensive reform of 
all aspects of our intelligence collection and analysis activities. […] The cold war intelligence 
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infrastructure is ill-suited to the new terrorist threat.”72 Another recommendation was 
recognizing “that the world has changed and old threats have been replaced by new ones. 
Organizations such as NATO that were created to counter the aggressive designs of a monolithic 
and imperial superpower must be re-oriented to defeat the pernicious schemes of terrorists.”73 
Still, these recommendations came several years too late. The State Department did not advocate 
an aggressive anti-Al Qaeda policy or change its own internal structures for dealing with 
terrorism in the years preceding 9/11.  
(D) Commissions and Reports 
In 2000, the Bremer Commission submitted a report to the 105th Congress entitled, 
“Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.” The report opened with a prescient 
quote from Thomas Schelling’s forward to the book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision: 
Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, 
bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so 
poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. […] It includes 
the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes 
somebody else is taking care of. […] Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin 
Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government’s (or an alliance’s) failure 
to anticipate effectively.74 
 
Read today, those words apply equally to the shock and surprise that overwhelmed the federal 
government in response to 9/11.  
 The Bremer Commission was one of several organizations that produced such a report 
calling for counterterrorism reform in the year leading up to 9/11. Another such organization was 
an independent task force cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which put out a 45-page policy memo, 
“State Department Reform.” The foreword reads, “The Berlin Wall fell ten years ago, and still 
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the United States is struggling to comes to terms with the post-Cold War world.” 75 The CFR-
CSIS commission advocated a plan of action centered on resources for reform, in which the 
president would issue a mandate to “force change upon the government’s resistant 
bureaucracies.”76 Among its most relevant assessments are the following: 
- “The Department of State is impaired by a professional culture that emphasizes 
confidentiality over public diplomacy and public affairs.” 
 
- “Foreign policy has been undermined by ineffective interagency coordination.”77 
 
Most presciently, the report identified that the foreign policy apparatus is ill-equipped to handle 
complex and growing threats: “As societies abroad continue to experience radical social and 
economic change, they will become more unstable and at times less hospitable to Americans. 
And the danger posed by international terrorism is increasing.”78 The CFR-CSIS commission 
was by no means the only group to identify this problem, but its timing just months before the 
9/11 attacks makes it particularly striking. To address these issues, the task force drew up a long 
list of recommendations to change the culture and structure of the State Department, including: 
- “Transform the Department of State’s culture into one of openness and public outreach. 
The 21st century diplomat must be a public affairs and public diplomacy diplomat.”79 
 
- Improving relationships with Congress, particularly for the purposes of cooperation on 
budget. “Engaging Congress, whose support is a necessary cornerstone to the effective 
development and implementation of foreign policy in a democracy of checks and 
balances, has to be elevated to a top priority.”80 
 
Again, these recommendations came too late. Had they been implemented immediately after the 
embassy or U.S.S. Cole bombings, they could have improved the State Department’s response to 
9/11, if not prevented the attacks entirely. 
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 (E) Transfer of Power 
 The final element in the prelude to disaster is the transfer of power from the Clinton 
administration to that of President George W. Bush in late 2000 and early 2001. For several 
years, the State Department attempted traditional diplomacy with Pakistan as part of its 
counterterrorism efforts. By the end of 1999, Under Secretary Thomas Pickering indicated that 
U.S.-Pakistan diplomacy and talks with the Taliban had “borne little fruit.”81 As Secretary 
Albright later explained, “We did not have a strong hand to play with the Pakistanis. Because of 
the sanctions required by U.S. law, we had few carrots to offer.”82 When President Bush came 
into office, his staff’s initial goal involved eliminating Al Qaeda via “a multiyear effort involving 
diplomacy, covert action, economic measures, law enforcement, public diplomacy, and if 
necessary military efforts. The State Department was to work with other governments to end all 
Al Qaeda sanctuaries, and also to work with the Treasury Department to disrupt terrorist 
financing.”83 Yet this strategy of traditional diplomacy ignored the reality that, from 1996 
onward, such diplomacy had repeatedly failed.84 
Four days after he was named Secretary of State-Designate, Colin Powell asked for and 
received a briefing from President Clinton’s Counterterrorism Security Group. He later testified 
to the 9/11 Commission that the briefing focused on Al Qaeda’s “growing threat to U.S. interests 
and Afghanistan’s role as a safe haven. As a matter of fact, that part of the briefing got my 
attention.”85 Just a week before 9/11, Secretary Powell met with the Director General of 
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence to express that the country had to take immediate and 
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concrete steps again Al Qaeda and the Taliban.86 He stressed that President Bush did not simply 
inherit and adopt the Clinton policy: “We noted early on that the actions the previous 
administration had tried had not succeeded in eliminating the threat.” 
 At the start of President Bush’s first term, Condoleezza Rice headed the National 
Security Council (NSC), of which the Secretary of State is a statutory attendee. Like Secretary 
Powell, Rice attended briefings in early 2001 on the threats faced by the United States: “During 
one of our conversations, [Clinton’s National Security Advisor Sandy Berger] said something 
that was often repeated after 9/11: he noted that I would spend far more time dealing with 
terrorism than I expected. […] Not much more was said.”87 Both in her 9/11 Commission 
testimony and her subsequent memoir, National Security Advisor Rice argued that the problem 
in the months leading up to 9/11 was not an absence of effort, but rather a systemic weakness. 
No single agency combined intelligence between U.S.-based operations and foreign ones. Threat 
reporting pointed toward an attack on American interests abroad, not domestically.88 She 
testified that no administration or organization alone failed to prevent the terrorist attacks: “The 
most critical issue was the stove-piping of information among government agencies and the seam 
between what we knew about foreign and domestic threats.”89 
In large-scale operations, a person or group must take charge of connecting the 
intelligence and implementing a plan. George Tenet, director of the CIA from 1997 to 2004, told 
the 9/11 Commission that “the system was blinking red” in the months before 9/11, “yet no one 
working on these late leads in the summer of 2001 connected the case in his or her inbox to the 
threat reports agitating senior officials and being briefed to the President. […] No one looked at 
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the bigger picture; no analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to 
the ground.”90 In the first eight months of 2001, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research produced 79 assessments on terrorism. According to Secretary Powell’s testimony, 
the intelligence was often imprecise and could not justify preemptive action. Counterterrorism 
failed to become a priority for State’s regional bureaus, though National Security Advisor Rice 
and Secretary Powell said the data indicated the danger was to Americans and American 
facilities abroad.91 The 9/11 Commission drew a similar conclusion: 
The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the foreign and domestic 
threats. The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign 
threats to U.S. interests there. The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of 
a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was looking 
for a foreign threat to domestic targets. The threat that was coming was not from 
sleeper cells. It was foreign — but from foreigners who had infiltrated the United 
States. A second cause of this disparity in response is that domestic agencies did 
not know what to do, and no one gave them direction.92 
 
Tenet, Powell, and Rice imply that given this structural flaw, nothing could have prevented the 
Al Qaeda attacks. After 9/11, they and their respective bureaucracies could only pick up the 
pieces. 
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Chapter 5: Impetus to Change 
Systems as large and entrenched as the State Department bureaucracy need an impetus to 
reform, regardless of whether that comes in the form of a crisis or pressure from an outside 
source. This chapter concentrates on three areas of change. First, it examines State in a historical 
context, assessing how the agency responded to other crises in the 20th century. Then, it looks at 
how the government behaved and made decisions the year following 9/11, highlighting the 
unique role that State could have played if given the chance. The final segment assesses how the 
9/11 Commission, its hearings, and its report acted as pressures on the State Department but had 
little success in creating change. 
(A) Previous State Department Reforms 
On September 12, 2001, the New York Times editorial read, “It was, in fact, one of those 
moments in which history splits, and we define the world as ‘before’ and ‘after.’”93 For the 
federal government in its modern form, history had split twice before: in 1945, following World 
War II, and in 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In an effort to shed light on the 
post-9/11 response, this section analyzes how the State Department bureaucracy reacted to those 
watershed moments. 
i. World War II 
In the 1940s, the State Department underwent major changes as a result of three factors: 
bureaucrats were significantly overworked; agencies reshuffled their duties and recombined in 
new ways during and after World War II; and the 1947 Hoover Commission on the Organization 
of the Executive Branch of the Government forced further reorganization across the federal 
government. On the eve of World War II, State staff put in 156,000 hours of unpaid overtime, 
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which demonstrated the need for a significant workforce expansion.94 This, in turn, would 
necessitate the creation of new offices and defined duties for the new hires to carry out. In 1943, 
Under Secretary Edward Stettinius led a reorganization. State Department historian Graham 
Stuart critiqued how these dramatic changes were implemented: “In an agency like the State 
Department, where international law, protocol, and diplomatic savoir-faire enter into the 
procedure, such a reorganization must be made slowly and by experts fully conversant with the 
intangibles in the conduct of foreign policy.”95 According to Stuart, the reorganization was 
executed hastily and largely in secret, without consulting key officials or allowing for criticism 
before changes were enacted.96 These flaws doomed the reorganization from the start.  
When Stettinius replaced Cordell Hull as Secretary of State in December 1944, the 
department reorganized again to focus on simplifying economic decisions. Additionally, the 
changes cemented the significance of the regional bureaus: “The importance of the geographic 
desks in the new reorganization was emphasized by allocating two Assistant Secretaries to direct 
their activities, James Dunn in charge of European, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and African 
Affairs, and Nelson Rockefeller in charge of American Republics Affairs.”97 In a burst of post-
war shifts at various federal agencies, State absorbed employees from now-defunct war offices. 
The total number of employees at State more than doubled from 6,452 in 1945 to 13,312 by 
1947.98 State incorporated and distributed these people into a newly established hierarchy (see 
Appendix 1 for an organizational chart). In an attempt to streamline information analysis in the 
ever-expanding department, Secretary George Marshall introduced the Policy Planning Staff in 
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1947, to be headed by famed diplomat George Kennan. The mission of the Policy Planning Staff 
would be to act as a think tank inside the department and give advice directly to the Secretary of 
State, essentially operating outside of the large, new bureaucracy. This legacy continues today. 
Directors of Policy Planning have included such notable foreign policy leaders as Paul Nitze, 
Walt Whitman Rostow, Paul Wolfowitz, Morton Halperin, Richard Haass, and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter.99 
Still, the department fielded criticism even after the second overhaul. In November 1945, 
The New York Herald Tribune wrote, “There is a tangled legacy from all sorts of conflicting 
policies and personalities being administered by an equal tangle of conflicting agencies and 
authorities. …The United States cannot indefinitely leave its foreign policy to the accidental 
interplay of the brilliant amateur, the opinionated, eccentric, and the bureaucratic intriguer.”100 
Stuart explained that the department still suffered from “forced expansion” and could not handle 
absorbing thousands of employees from old war agencies. Furthermore, he noted that 
investigations of the reorganization highlight the failure “to effect the close relationship 
necessary between political, economic, cultural, and intelligence matters,” which is integral to 
the formulation of a sound foreign policy.101 Regardless of its shortcomings, the defining trait of 
the 1940s changes was that incorporating new employees forced the State Department to address 
its structural issues head-on. Furthermore, the Hoover Commission made reorganization a 
national priority in a way that has not been seen since. 
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  ii. Post-Cold War 
The end of the Cold War necessarily demanded changes to the State Department 
apparatus, as a bipolar world turned into a multipolar one almost overnight. Secretary of State 
James Baker put together a task force in 1991 to recommend appropriate changes. In December 
1992, the 18-member commission released a 99-page executive summary, State 2000: A New 
Model for Foreign Affairs. The report contained dozens of recommendations for consolidating 
and restructuring the department, its bureaus, and its independent offices. President George H.W. 
Bush’s administration read the report but did not act on its suggestions. President Clinton came 
into office pledging to reorganize the nation’s foreign policy structure to respond to post-Cold 
War challenges. When Warren Christopher took over as Secretary of State in 1993, he succeeded 
in convincing Congress to pass legislation creating new, consolidated offices, such as the Bureau 
for Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime, but failed to persuade the White House and Congress to 
increase funding for State.102 “Although the Clinton administration did make some structural and 
procedural changes during its first two years in office, the changes fell well short of 
fundamentally altering the structure, operation, or culture of the State Department.”103 The 103rd 
Congress was more focused on economic recovery and attention-grabbing issues like the Brady 
Handgun Bill and ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ than bureaucratic reform. 
In November 1994, Republicans took control of both houses of Congress and promised to 
slash foreign aid and other diplomatic projects. The White House responded by putting Vice 
President Al Gore in charge of the ‘Reinventing Government’ initiative, and in 1995, he issued a 
call to all federal agencies to submit proposals for making their bureaucracy more efficient. 
Secretary Christopher responded to the request by calling for the merger of the U.S. Agency for 
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International Development (USAID), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and 
the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department. The suggestion of this merger 
triggered an intense fight in Washington: “To increase the political heat on the White House, 
officials from USAID, ACDA, and USIA faxed articles and studies trumpeting the virtues of 
their agencies to major newspapers, and they urged their friends outside government to write 
letters and columns criticizing the merger.”104 Vice President Gore initially responded negatively 
to the merger concept. In mid-February 1995, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), the new chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote a Washington Post editorial entitled, 
“Christopher Is Right.” Several weeks later, Senator Helms introduced reform legislation in 
Congress.  
Beyond the merger of the agencies, the initial bill suggested reducing half of the 
workforce at USAID, a quarter at USIA, and at least nine percent at the State Department. The 
savings sought by Republicans would thus come through personnel reductions, not program 
cuts.105 In March 1997, the House International Relations Committee introduced its own State 
Department bill, also calling for the merger but not the staff reductions and giving the executive 
branch more flexibility in implementing the changes. Congressional Democrats attempted to 
derail the legislation through a Senate filibuster, but Senator Helms and Senator John Kerry (D-
MA) struck a compromise. Some staff would be laid off but most of the $1.7 billion in savings 
would come from reducing salaries and other administrative expenses, and the State Department 
would lose no more than 15 percent of its operating budget. Senators Helms and Kerry did not 
agree to eliminate any federal agencies, but the magnitude of the agreed-upon cuts would 
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ultimately require this.106 The fight was far from over. President Clinton vetoed the State 
Department authorization bill, and Congress fell far short of the necessary votes to override the 
veto.  
Thus, in the period between 1993 and 1996, the State Department did not fundamentally 
change despite public rhetoric in Washington about the desperate need for post-Cold War 
reforms. Political scientist James Lindsay attributes this absence of change to four factors: (1) 
bureaucratic resistance at State and the other agencies that faced cuts, (2) congressional 
intransigence, (3) disinterest on the part of the Clinton White House on matters of bureaucratic 
organization, and (4) the absence of consensus.107 Lindsay places much of the blame on the 
president himself, saying, “Of course, government reorganization is a low priority with most 
presidents, but Clinton’s absence from the debate is notable, given his oft-stated public pledge to 
reinvent government.”108 The White House finally took ownership over this issue by 1997 and 
sent a new plan to Congress for sweeping changes. The Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act abolished the ACDA and USIA, reallocating their duties to the State 
Department, and made USAID a statutory agency whose administrator answers to the Secretary 
of State. The changes went into effect in 1999 — a full decade after the Berlin Wall came down. 
In this case, reforms did occur, but not without a long battle and multiple delays. The 
Bush ’41 administration did not act on the State 2000 recommendations at all. Even though 
President Clinton came into office promising reforms, he did not deliver on that pledge until 
Republicans in Congress forced him to act. While the end of the Cold War opened a window of 
opportunity, change came as a result of a reform-minded leader — Secretary Christopher — and 
a pressurized political environment. As was the case after World War II, many of the changes at 
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State occurred through absorption of other agencies and their functions. This would not be the 
case after 9/11. 
(B) Immediate Aftermath of 9/11 
The magnitude of the events of 9/11 created such a new, uncertain world that change 
seemed necessary and imminent. This was an opportunity for the government to demonstrate its 
capacity for leadership. In her memoir, National Security Advisor (and later Secretary of State) 
Rice writes that every day after September 11th felt like September 12th: “Our entire concept of 
what constituted security had been shaken. The governmental institutions simply didn’t exist to 
deal with a threat of this kind. And so in the first days and months ad hoc arrangements had to 
fill the void.”109 In those first tense weeks, Bush, Rice, Powell, and likely many others were 
influenced by “formative experiences during and after the Cold War.”110 According to foreign 
policy historian Melvyn Leffler and political scientist Jeffrey Legro, “The immediate response to 
9/11 was generated by an ad hoc group dominated by officials in the Defense Department, the 
CIA, and the Office of the Vice President (at least insofar as Afghanistan was concerned).”111 In 
other words, the State Department was often not at the forefront of decision-making, and 
intragovernmental bickering impeded integrated strategy.112 
In the winter of 2001-2, the Bush administration formulated a foreign policy approach 
comprised of intensification of counterterrorism efforts, homeland security, fighting global 
poverty, and Iraq.113 A year after 9/11, the White House rolled out the 2002 National Security 
Strategy, drafted by National Security Advisor Rice with Phillip Zelikow, a diplomat and 
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political scientist acting as an outside consultant.114 The document, like many reports and 
strategy papers before it, opened with a description of how freedom triumphed over 
totalitarianism in the 20th century and projected that the great struggle of the 21st century would 
be between freedom and violent extremism.115 The section entitled, “Strengthen Alliances to 
Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends,” discussed 
coordinating efforts with regional partners and disrupting terrorist organizations, but omitted any 
specific references to the State Department or its efforts.116 The discussion about State was 
relegated to the last page of the report, after the plans regarding the NSC and the Department of 
Defense. The report promised, “We will ensure that the Department of State receives funding 
sufficient to ensure the success of American diplomacy.”117  
Rather than painting a comprehensive, nuanced portrait of the efforts coordinated by 
State, the National Security Strategy simply said, “The State Department takes the lead in 
managing our bilateral relationships with other governments.”118 In a new administration focused 
on transnational problems like terrorism, this sidelined State by making its prescribed role no 
longer seem as relevant. While intelligence and defense can be used preventatively in the short 
term — warning the United States, for example, of an impending attack — State has a unique 
role to play in the fight against terrorism. Diplomacy is an instrument of public pressure. The 
secret work done by the intelligence community is necessary and invaluable, but diplomats can 
put discussions out in the open. They garner support from other governments in the region 
against terrorist organizations and, more importantly, undermine the support terrorist groups 
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receive from local populations through savvy public diplomacy. When State’s role is seen as 
secondary, this hinders America’s ability to solve the terrorism issue in the long run. Curbing the 
problems that terrorists have with the West will require more than securing the nation’s borders 
or obtaining reliable intelligence. 
(C) 9/11 Commission and Other Pressures on State 
 Scholars often suggest that large-scale government change requires a window of 
opportunity and external pressure, such as through a bipartisan commission, the executive 
branch, or Congress. This was the case with previous State Department reforms after World War 
II and the Cold War. In his book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, political scientist 
John Kingdon argues, “Policy windows open infrequently, and do not stay open long.”119 Donald 
Kettl, a public administration scholar, discusses the challenges of capitalizing on a policy 
window opened by a crisis: 
Initially, everyone says, ‘This is awful, we have to make sure this never happens 
again.’ Everyone gets all charged up. Then ordinary life resumes, and there’s a 
concern that we overreacted. […] You can easily get yourself in a situation where 
new problems pop up, and old problems don’t seem quite so serious. Then maybe 
the sense of crisis doesn’t seem as great as it was. Putting all that together, there’s 
this combined sense about how big events shape policy.120 
 
Kettl notes that while the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations were thoughtful and well 
calibrated, intelligence failures surrounding the Iraq War created a distrust of the government. As 
a result, the commission’s recommendations may not have been taken as seriously. An absence 
of public pressure can often lead Congressmen and women to give up on reform projects. 
Furthermore, the American system resists sudden change, even when faced with an urgent 
matter. According to Kettl: 
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It’s so difficult to work within the political system. We have a system that ensures 
we don’t do too much too fast. What we complain about often is what our 
founders agreed to early on. It’s not at all surprising that we constantly wonder 
about effectiveness. Constraints are hardwired into the Constitution.121 
 
The events of September 11th created a major policy window on which the 9/11 Commission 
sought to capitalize. Reading the report reveals that the commission applied limited pressure to 
the State Department and thus had a limited impact on its operations. 
The 9/11 Commission Report discusses State primarily in its consular capacity, as in how 
terrorists obtain visas and find their way into the United States. The report largely ignores State’s 
public outreach and diplomatic efforts. One telling sentence reads, “The most hopeful possibility 
seemed now to lie in diplomacy — but not diplomacy managed by the Department of State, 
which focused primarily on India-Pakistan nuclear tensions.”122 Several decades earlier, there 
existed no forms of diplomacy outside of those conducted by the State Department. Now, the 
Pentagon engages in its own public diplomacy, spending hundreds of millions of dollars to pay 
contractors to produce news and entertainment programs.123 The 9/11 Commission Report 
concludes by making 41 policy recommendations. None of them specifically cite State, though 
they do address the Pentagon, DHS, the FBI, and the CIA. The first ten recommendations deal 
with issues where State can play a crucial role: identifying terrorist sanctuaries; engaging 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia; and defining a counterterrorism strategy. The most 
relevant recommendations to State are: 
(5) “The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We 
should offer an example of moral leadership in the world. […] To Muslim 
parents, terrorists like Bin Laden have nothing to offer their children but visions 
of violence and death. America and its friends have a crucial advantage — we can 
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offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future. If we 
heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, a moderate 
consensus can be found.” 
 
(7) “Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad 
vigorously. America does stand up for its values. […] The United States should 
rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young 
people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it 
should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States.”124 
 
In response to the 9/11 Commission Report, Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) held a hearing in 
the House International Relations Committee in August 2004. Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) noted 
in his opening remarks, “Today we are here to examine and redefine the State Department’s role 
as the government’s main implementing agency of soft power in the war on terror. […] To win 
that fight, we must also win a tough battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslim world.” He 
outlined how the United States should go to new lengths to engage Muslim communities around 
the globe and recognize that this is a matter of national security. He concluded, “I hope to hear 
today that the State Department has heard the alarm.”125 
Nine top-ranking State Department officials then testified about various goals, ranging 
from reforming public diplomacy strategies to creating more secure borders. The key witness 
was Christopher Kojm, the deputy executive director of the 9/11 Commission and the former 
deputy assistant secretary for intelligence policy and coordination in the State Department’s 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. When asked what he would do if he were Secretary of 
State, Kojm emphasized the importance of having more money for public diplomacy and local 
aid such as fixing roads or building schools.126 Though this day of hearings on State Department 
reforms added some of the requisite external pressure necessary for change, Congress held far 
more hearings on 9/11-related intelligence failures and later the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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As with the 9/11 Commission, State was not even a secondary focus. Once again, 
evaluating State fell by the wayside. Intelligence failures had to take priority in the post-9/11 
discussions, because had anyone connected the dots, the terrorists could have been kept out of 
the country and the attacks avoided. Still, intelligence alone cannot permanently resolve the 
terrorism problem. Without public pressure and attention from commissions, State is unlikely to 
gain more funding from Congress, thereby continuing the cycle in which it cannot fully perform 
its diplomatic role because of a lack of resources. 
(D) The Limited Effectiveness of Commissions 
The conventional wisdom on government commissions is that they are ineffective and 
rarely create change. A Washington Post reporter joked, “There are two ways to bury something 
in Washington: 1) Dig a hole in the ground, insert something, and cover it. 2) Appoint an 
advisory commission to report on watchamaycallit.”127 By contrast, the conventional wisdom on 
the 9/11 Commission is that it is the notable exception to the doomed-commission rule. National 
security scholar Richard Betts applauded the 9/11 Commission for successfully marketing its 
recommendations and “reaching a bipartisan agreement not to make it a blame game.”128 
Terrorism expert and Georgetown University professor Bruce Hoffman also spoke of the 
commission’s report as a “consensus document” whose “recommendations have been taken 
seriously.”129 On the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Bipartisan Policy Center in 
Washington, DC issued a report card on the 9/11 Commission Report’s recommendations. 
According to the assessment, 32 of the commission’s 41 recommendations have been fulfilled.130 
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Scholars disagree on commission effectiveness. Jordan Tama, an expert in this field, 
wrote a book in 2011 entitled, Terrorism and National Security Reform. He defines a 
commission as a temporary panel of two or more people, including at least one private citizen, 
created by an act of Congress or the executive branch with the mandate to produce a final report 
within four years.131 Tama argues that several factors determine the effectiveness of a national 
security commission: political credibility (more so than specialized knowledge), a window of 
opportunity, the narrowness of its mandate, and whether the commission was created by the 
Congress or the executive branch.132 Even given a window of opportunity created by a crisis and 
heightened political pressure, change may not occur: “Reform does not happen easily or 
automatically after a crisis, because entrenched bureaucratic interests often put up powerful 
resistance to reform, and bargaining obstacles can prevent policy makers from reaching mutually 
beneficial agreements.”133 
Based on Tama’s criteria, the 9/11 Commission seemed destined for failure. For one, the 
Bush White House opposed the commission’s creation. The Republican and Democratic 
appointees to the commission also could have created a blame game, pinning responsibility on 
either the Clinton or Bush administrations. Third, the due date for the report was set at May 2004 
— potentially after the window of opportunity had slammed shut.134 When the 567-page report 
came out in the summer of 2004, it exceeded all expectations. American novelist John Updike 
praised its fluid prose, writing in the New Yorker that the King James Bible was “our language’s 
lone masterpiece produced by a committee, at least until this year’s 9/11 Commission Report.”135 
Not everyone held it in such high esteem. Richard Clarke, the former director of counterterrorism 
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at the National Security Council, responded with a New York Times opinion piece called, 
“Honorable Commission, Toothless Report.”136 Still, politicians and the public read the report 
with great interest. Over six million people downloaded the free PDF online, and 1.5 million 
bought the print edition — a rarity for a Washington publication that is hundreds of pages 
long.137 The book was number one on the New York Times bestseller list for nonfiction 
paperbacks for eleven weeks.138 
In the subsequent months, Congress passed the “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act.” The legislation received media buzz for establishing the Director of National 
Intelligence, which Tama calls “the most significant reorganization of the intelligence 
community in nearly sixty years.”139 In addition, the reforms created a National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC), a freestanding organization whose director reports to the president and the 
director of national intelligence. The NCTC draws experts from the CIA and FBI to integrate 
intelligence, mandates new requirements for interagency intelligence sharing, and sets rules for 
prioritizing the appointment of national security advisors in times of presidential transition.140 
Many of the measures that were not adopted in this initial round of legislation were later 
included fully or in part in the “9/11 Commission Implementation Act,” leading pundits to call 
the 9/11 Commission among the most successful reform efforts in recent memory.141 Neither of 
these two pieces of legislation concentrated on the Department of State. Although the changes 
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affect State in terms of how it interacts with other agencies, they did not significantly alter the 
way the agency operates or does its diplomatic work every day. 
Does the passage of legislation mean a commission succeeds? The 9/11 Commission did 
overcome obstacles like its broad mandate, and more than three-quarters of its recommendations 
became law. Yet this, too, did not change Washington overnight.142 For example, not everyone 
agrees that the Director of National Intelligence position was an improvement. Policymakers also 
debate the value of adding the Department of Homeland Security: “Whereas some experts argue 
that the reorganizations improved coordination and information sharing, others claim they 
created unnecessary layers of bureaucracy.”143 Overall, commission effectiveness scholar Jordan 
Tama supports the changes: “The reality is that the overhauls have enabled the government to 
connect the dots more adeptly and to act in a more integrated fashion, but at the cost of some 
additional bloat.”144 Still, many of the changes pertained strictly to security or intelligence issues, 
not to diplomacy. 
 The smartest kind of national security strategy combines the hard power of military 
capabilities with the soft power of diplomacy and public outreach (an in-depth discussion of soft 
power follows in chapter 6). The 9/11 Commission, its hearings, and its report focused on 
intelligence failures for the right reasons — resolving those gaps is crucial to preventing another 
terrorist attack on America’s soil. Yet reforming the intelligence and defense communities at the 
exclusion of the diplomatic community will not benefit America in the long-term. The roots of 
the terrorism problem are the radicalized citizens of the Arab world, whose deep dissatisfaction 
with the United States will not be quelled through weapons or intelligence. In fact, exercising 
hard power without the aid of cultural exchanges, empowerment projects, and bilateral dialogues 
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may further alienate people. Just as the CIA and the Pentagon needed to evolve to confront 
terrorism and other transnational problems, so, too, does the State Department. In the absence of 
public pressure and commission attention, however, this kind of evolution is unlikely to occur. 
While the 9/11 Commission succeeded in changing the intelligence community, for better or 
worse, its recommendations failed to impact the State Department in a significant manner. 
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Chapter 6: Post-9/11 Changes 
Though the State Department was not overtly named in the 9/11 Commission’s 41 
recommendations, State heeded the suggestions from the report and the subsequent congressional 
hearings by redefining its efforts in three areas — counterterrorism coordination, public 
diplomacy, and 21st century statecraft — detailed below. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion about the value of soft power, reinforcing that the three areas of advancement are 
indeed significant. 
(A) Bureau of Counterterrorism 
 In response to the 9/11 Commission, State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 
Review (QDDR) promised to create a new Bureau for Counterterrorism (S/CT), elevating the 
rank of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to full bureau status and promoting its 
director to the position of Assistant Secretary. The purpose of this change is to allow for more 
effective interagency coordination and intelligence sharing. As outlined in the QDDR, the new 
bureau would: (1) work with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and 
the new Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, (2) enhance State’s abilities to 
assist partner organization in their counterterrorism efforts, and (3) engage in bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy for counterterrorism purposes.145 Significantly, S/CT is now the State 
Department’s primary liaison to DHS.146 
State established the new bureau in January 2012 under the leadership of Daniel 
Benjamin. On a symbolic level, this change both reflected State’s growing commitment to 
counterterrorism and put State at the forefront of the battle against violent extremism. After 
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being sidelined in the wake of 9/11, State reclaimed its stake in the conversation. In a press 
briefing, Benjamin explained that the 120 employees and contractors in S/CT “will lead in 
supporting U.S. counterterrorism diplomacy and seek to strengthen homeland security, 
countering violent extremism, and build the capacity of partner nations to deal effectively with 
terrorism.”147 Among the most substantial reorganization changes, the bureau created a Strategic 
Plans and Policy Unit to implement metrics to measure program effectiveness, and Benjamin 
planned to “tighten coordination between counterterrorism policy and programs.”148 
The other significant change in counterterrorism strategy is the creation of the Center for 
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). President Obama mandated this initiative 
in September 2011 through Executive Order 13584. Designed to influence audiences overseas, 
the new center aims to spread facts that undermine terrorist organizations’ propaganda. As the 
executive order explains, “These communications strategies focus not only on the violent actions 
and human costs of terrorism, but also on narratives that can positively influence those who may 
be susceptible to radicalization and recruitment by terrorist organizations.”149 The order 
references countering the actions and ideologies of Al Qaeda — the only terrorist organization 
named in the document — by monitoring the spread of information, identifying emerging trends, 
and promulgating public communication strategies for countering violent extremism. While 
anticipating vast coordination with the Pentagon, DOJ, DHS, the Department of the Treasury, the 
National Counterterrorism Center, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Counterterrorism Center of the 
CIA, the Broadcast Board of Governors (which runs Voice of America), and USAID, Executive 
Order 13584 places the authority for the CSCC squarely within the State Department. 
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(B) Public Diplomacy 
In one of the most quoted lines in the foreign policy community, diplomat Richard 
Holbrooke asked after 9/11, “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading 
communications society?”150 At the State Department, reforms in public diplomacy are arguably 
the most profound and visible changes since 9/11. The U.S. Information Agency initially handled 
public relations on behalf of the federal government, beginning at the height of the Cold War in 
1953. After the 1998 merger (explained in chapter 5), State took over this role by creating the 
Under Secretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy. In the bureaucratic hierarchy, the 
Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, which coordinates exchanges including the Fulbright 
Program, and the Bureau of International Information Programs, which deals with 
communications efforts, answer to the Under Secretary. Many of the regional bureaus have their 
own public diplomacy offices, which lengthens the chain of command and requires any 
bureaucrat seeking to obtain clearance on a document to check in with extra people. In the 13 
years since it took over public diplomacy, State has sought to increase the number of programs 
and their visibility, even in the face of budget cuts. This became all the more important after the 
September 11th attacks, as American relationships with the Muslim world faltered. 
A year after 9/11, Peter Peterson, then the chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
published an article about the role of public diplomacy in the War on Terror.151 The goal of 
public diplomacy is to influence public opinion and mobilize support in favor of American 
policies, yet he argues that the federal government still has to make great strides in its efforts.152 
He explains that Americans are not perceived as being empathetic toward the plights of others, 
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which breeds foreign resentment of American wealth. These negative attitudes and sentiments of 
distrust are particularly high in the Middle East and among the Muslim diaspora.153 According to 
Peterson: 
Addressing the image problem should be viewed as no less than a vital 
component of national security. Defending America’s homeland, seeking out and 
destroying terrorists, and using public diplomacy to facilitate allied support of the 
United States and to reduce the attractiveness of terrorism are all part of the same 
battle.154 
 
Public diplomacy can determine whether an initiative succeeds or fails. Thus, it is crucial to 
implement a public diplomacy strategy from the earliest planning stages: “Too often public 
diplomacy is seen as reactive, not proactive, and as a response (often defensive) to a crisis.”155 
The government has a long way to go in integrating public diplomacy into every foreign affairs 
engagement. 
To demonstrate the value of public diplomacy, State needs to streamline and prioritize 
projects so that the agency can demonstrate real results. Peterson urges channeling more effort 
toward foreign public opinion polling and using that information to do targeted marketing toward 
particular subsets of audiences abroad. If American voices are off-putting among certain groups, 
diplomats should direct their energies toward promoting the voices of America’s allies that have 
broader appeal. Training is integral to making outreach efforts succeed. Extensive public 
diplomacy training is optional for Foreign Service Officers, and even public diplomacy 
specialists’ early diplomatic assignments are often in a consular capacity rather than in public 
diplomacy.156  
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Like many previous critics and commissions, Peterson recommends a substantial funding 
increase for public diplomacy and making these efforts a major part of each regional bureau’s 
deputy assistant secretary’s duties. From 1993 to 2001, funding for State’s cultural programs 
declined, and American exchanges with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen fell 21 percent.157 By 
the time 9/11 occurred, American support in the Muslim world had greatly eroded. In the decade 
since then, public diplomacy efforts have sought to reverse that trend. A 2011 Brookings 
Institution poll found that the Arab world’s approval of the United States had improved from ten 
percent in 2010 to 25 percent in 2011, perhaps as a result of America’s handling of the Arab 
spring.158 On the whole, President Obama’s approval abroad is higher than that of President 
Bush. Of course, these statistics are a result of numerous factors, but public diplomacy does play 
some role. Fifty-nine percent of Arabs polled expressed unfavorable views of the United States, 
and public diplomacy can do much to remedy that.159 
In June 2009, Secretary of State Clinton created the Special Representative to Muslim 
Communities and appointed Farah Pandith to fill the post. Born in India, Pandith worked on 
issues including Muslim engagement and countering violent extremism at the NSC and then at 
State. Secretary Clinton tasked her with creating a ‘new beginning’ between Americans and 
Muslims around the world: “It’s a relationship that requires us to listen, share ideas, and find 
areas of common ground in order to expand a peaceful, prosperous future. […] This is a dialogue 
that is not going to focus solely on terrorism or radicalization but instead focus on what we all 
have in common.”160 Since taking on her position almost three years ago, Pandith has addressed 
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hundreds of audiences and connected young leaders through initiatives like Generation Change, 
a global network that fosters collaboration at the grassroots level. Her major undertaking was 
2011 Hours Against Hate, a partnership with the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-
Semitism that encouraged students around the globe to volunteer their time in a community 
whose dominant religion was not their own.161 Through exposure to diversity, the program aimed 
to teach tolerance and achieve the goals of public diplomacy in an organic way.162 Pandith’s 
appointment is a powerful example of how adding another office in a bureaucracy need not be a 
burden — if done properly, it can be an asset. 
(C) 21st Century Statecraft Initiative 
In response to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, Secretary of State Rice hired 
Jared Cohen in 2006 to advance digital projects and communication technology.163 At age 24, the 
former Rhodes Scholar became the youngest member of the Policy Planning Staff. The following 
year, Cohen also published Children of Jihad, a book about his experiences traveling in the 
Middle East. He describes encounters with Iranian students who professed their love of 
American music or cited Voice of America as their favorite news source.164 Many young people 
flocked to Internet cafes, where they could communicate digitally without fearing their IP 
address would be traced: “The Internet is far too large and there are far too many sites for the 
government to effectively monitor what its youth say and do in this digital realm.”165 Cohen 
clearly admires their desire to connect. Through interviews and observation, he concludes: 
For young people, technology is first and foremost a means to express themselves, 
interact, generate their own media, and shape a digital identity that may or may 
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not be in sync with real life. They rely on this technology for their autonomy and 
as a result, it is through this digital means that the youth have been emancipated 
from the rest of the population. They are incredibly proficient at learning the 
innovative uses of technology. […] Unless they have deliberately shielded 
themselves from technology, nearly every single youth in the Middle East is 
accessible.166 
 
Cohen brought his experiences from Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Iraq to the State Department, 
where he would push the bureaucracy to engage Middle Eastern youth and thereby decrease their 
participation in terrorist organizations. 
At State, Cohen did much of the work for the 21st Century Statecraft initiative, which 
launched in 2010.167 Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the Director of Policy Planning, spelled out the 
basis of this new program in a Foreign Affairs article entitled, “America’s Edge: Power in the 
Networked Century.” Slaughter outlines the consequences of living in a networked world, 
including that even a small group of terrorists can rely on a support system that magnifies their 
impact. Networks, she writes, exist “above the state, below the state, and through the state.”168 
Implicitly, Slaughter recognizes that the state can influence but not control digital 
communication. She concedes that governments worldwide have been slower to embrace digital 
networks than non-government organizations or private companies, which have long known that 
while networks cannot guarantee a particular outcome, they provide the kind of connectivity that 
proves essential in a crisis or when an organization needs to brainstorm new ideas.169  
Slaughter argues that the defining aspect of the 21st century will be agencies and 
corporations “collecting the best ideas from around the globe” and implementing them.170 She 
applauds companies like Google for having an almost nonexistent hierarchy, promoting a culture 
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of creativity that is absent in government agencies. Through 21st Century Statecraft, the State 
Department is attempting to achieve that energy and efficiency in a dense bureaucratic structure. 
The initiative took off in January 2010. Two major events occurred that month: the Text Haiti 
project raised more than $40 million for victims of the Haitian earthquake disaster, and Google 
announced it would no longer abide by China’s censorship laws. Suddenly, social media and the 
proliferation of technology topped meeting agendas at the highest levels of the State Department. 
A week later, Secretary Clinton delivered an address on Internet freedom and “the freedom to 
connect.”171 Her passion for this agenda became pivotal for selling other government officials 
and President Obama on these issues. A New York Times Magazine profile of Cohen and Alec 
Ross, his State partner in digital innovation, described 21st Century Statecraft as “a shift in form 
and in strategy — a way to amplify traditional diplomatic efforts, develop tech-based policy 
solutions and encourage cyberactivism.”172  
In line with the 21st Century Statecraft agenda, State has expanded its social media 
presence. The Office of eDiplomacy was founded in 2003 as part of the Bureau of Information 
Resource Management, but it did not undertake social media immediately. Social media 
exploded several years into the 2000s: Facebook was founded in February 2004, YouTube in 
2005, and Twitter in 2006. Yet State did not begin engaging in social media until 2010 and 
particularly 2011 — almost five years after most of these sites were founded. The following 
chart reflects the significant growth in the State Department’s social media presence over the 
past two years.173 
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The digital bounds continue to be blurry. When Cohen directly emailed Twitter chairman 
Jack Dorsey to ask him to postpone Twitter maintenance during Iran’s election in 2009 so that 
Iranian citizens could keep communicating online, public speculation ensued about whether the 
U.S. government had crossed the line. Did such a move constitute intervention in the Iranian 
election? Secretary Clinton chose to stand by Cohen’s action. Critics like Evgeny Morozov, a 
technology scholar, condemn Internet freedom initiatives at the federal level because they have 
the potential to benefit non-democratic regimes: “Democratic and authoritarian states alike are 
now seeking ‘information sovereignty’ from American companies, especially those perceived as 
being in bed with the U.S. government.”174 Morozov argues that Washington cannot control 
Silicon Valley, much less civil society groups abroad. Yet as Ross explains, “Technology isn’t 
going anywhere. So we can fear we can’t control it and ignore the space, or we can recognize we 
can’t control it, but we can influence it.”175 Given the limitless nature of the Internet, it may offer 
the best solution to transnational challenges. Though the State Department ventured into the 
realm of digital technology cautiously, it has made remarkable progress since hiring Cohen and 
Ross. 
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In 2010, Cohen co-wrote a pivotal Foreign Affairs article entitled, “The Digital 
Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion Power,” with Google CEO Eric Schmidt. Just weeks 
before the Arab Spring embroiled the Middle East and North Africa in protests coordinated via 
social media, Cohen and Schmidt argued, “The advent and power of connection technologies —
 tools that connect people to vast amounts of information and to one another — will make the 
twenty-first century all about surprises.”176 In what they termed the “interconnected estate,” a 
play off of Abbe Sieyes’ famous pamphlet on the Third Estate in the French Revolution, 
individuals will be empowered to create rapid change, occasionally with negative or 
unpredictable results. Governments will be forced to acknowledge that citizen-led initiatives may 
prove more dynamic, popular, and attractive than those produced top-down, even in democratic 
states.  
Those who argue against digital diplomacy say that too much engagement with people 
outside the system — people who may not understand official U.S. government positions or have 
security clearances — means relinquishing too much control. In response, Cohen counters, “The 
21st century is a really terrible time to be a control freak.” 177 Yet the State Department functions 
through control mechanisms, with ‘need to know’ policies and specific diplomatic channels 
acting as the main mediums for projects. Thus, convincing everyone at Foggy Bottom of the 
importance of 21st Century Statecraft will take time. 
(D) The Value of Soft Power 
 Most of these post-9/11 changes — coordinating counterterrorism communications, 
engaging youth and civilian activists, going digital through 21st Century Statecraft — are 
examples of bolstering soft power. Not everyone sees the immediate value in this, which is 
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apparent through budget allocations and program reductions (discussed in greater detail in 
chapters 7 and 8). Yet in a world where the NSC, the Department of Defense, and the CIA take 
the lead in areas that used to be controlled by the State Department, one of the few spaces where 
State has a built-in advantage and superior expertise is public diplomacy and soft power. 
Embracing this role and excelling at it would not only enhance America’s standing in the world 
but also increase State’s standing among other agencies. 
Public diplomacy goes hand-in-hand with soft power. In March 2008, Harvard political 
scientist Joseph Nye penned a much-cited Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science article on this topic, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” 178 He defines soft 
power as obtaining a desired outcome through means other than coercion or payment, in other 
words operating outside the traditional ‘carrots and sticks’ model of foreign policy. Public 
diplomacy advances soft power, which is crucial because a sound national security strategy 
combines hard and soft power. Nye writes, “Soft power is not merely influence […]. It is also the 
ability to entice and attract.”179 Public diplomacy attracts new or previously hostile audiences 
through cultural exports and exchanges. This idea emerged during World War II and the early 
Cold War period. President Roosevelt created the Office of Wartime Information, which 
infamously shaped Hollywood films into propaganda tools. Later, Voice of America and Radio 
Free Europe would harness the new technology of radio to appeal to audiences abroad.180 When 
the Berlin Wall came down, the American approach to public diplomacy changed: “Americans 
were far more interested in budget savings than in investments of soft power. […] Public 
diplomacy had become so identified with fighting the cold war that few Americans noticed that 
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with an information revolution occurring, soft power was becoming more rather than less 
important.”181 Today, the Internet produces an overwhelming amount of information, meaning 
that attention and credibility are in higher demand than the content itself. Everyone wants to 
know where to look and when.  
Achieving a high level of credibility with international audiences demands resources — 
in the form of funding but also in the form of innovative thinkers. As Nye argues, “The 
effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by minds changed (as shown in interviews or 
polls), not dollars spent or slick production packages.”182 For example, he writes, Congress 
poured money into Alhurra, an Arabic-language satellite channel in the Middle East, but 
audiences there see the program as propaganda, and it cannot compete with Al Jazeera. As such, 
Alhurra lacks public diplomacy value.183 Additionally, ideas that succeed domestically may fail 
abroad. President Bush’s term ‘axis of evil’ played well after his 2002 State of the Union, but 
foreigners found the phrase moralistic. The British Foreign Office forbade its diplomats from 
using ‘axis of evil’ because it reminded audiences of Al Qaeda’s global jihad narrative.184 
Competent and well-trained public diplomacy experts at the State Department can resolve these 
kinds of situations, enhancing America’s soft power even outside of diplomatic channels and 
negotiations. 
More recently, Nye wrote an opinion piece on soft power in Foreign Policy as a response 
to congressional budget cuts. He warns, “U.S. foreign policy has tended to over-rely on hard 
power in recent years because it is the most direct and visible source of American strength. The 
Pentagon is the best-trained and best-resourced arm of the U.S. government, but there are limits 
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to what hard power can achieve on its own.”185 An overuse of hard power undercuts soft power, 
such as when the Soviet Union repressed uprisings in Hungary and Czechoslovakia or when 
mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib tainted the American involvement in Iraq. In practice, 
politicians too often prefer the mobilization of hard power because it yields quicker results: “The 
payoffs for exchange and assistance programs is often measured in decades, not weeks or 
months.”186 Furthermore, no single agency oversees a strategy or budget for soft power tools — 
such as public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, and disaster relief — though if one 
agency were to do so, State is the obvious choice. The expansion of the soft-power approach at 
the State Department is significant and should be regarded as such. Still, much has yet to be 
accomplished in this realm. 
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Chapter 7: Ongoing Challenges 
 Citing what has not changed is more difficult, as State Department officials are unlikely 
to name failed projects or missed opportunities in public forums. Still, the analysis in chapter 6 
reveals areas where the State Department moved too slowly or failed to act at all. Recognizing 
these ongoing structural and policy challenges opens the door to improving the system into one 
that is more efficient and responsive to 21st-century threats. Five original conclusions can be 
drawn from the current structure of the State Department and policy papers released by State and 
the White House: 
(1) The changes to the Bureau of Counterterrorism were enacted in January 2012, over a decade 
after 9/11 occurred. This change — that incidentally did more to change the bureau’s position in 
the organization and entailed minimal reorganization — required pressure from both the 9/11 
Commission and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review before it took place. This 
slow pace of reform inhibits State’s ability to do its job effectively. 
(2) Public diplomacy efforts continue to exist in both the regional bureaus and the functional 
bureaus with attempted coordination by the Bureau of Public Affairs. Although public 
diplomacy efforts have expanded, particularly in regard to Muslim communities, no evidence 
exists to indicate that these efforts are better coordinated today than before. Measuring the 
success of public diplomacy initiatives is a murky, difficult process, but measuring coordination 
is not. Multiple regional and functional bureaus should not be filing concurrent budget requests 
for public diplomacy projects. A streamlined chain of command with a definitive hierarchy 
would resolve this coordination dilemma. 
(3) The successes in counterterrorism and public diplomacy came largely in the form of policy 
changes, not structural changes. With the notable exception of the creation of the Office of the 
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Special Representative to Muslim Communities, the internal structure of the State Department 
looks much like it did at the turn of the 21st century. Structural changes are not always necessary 
or an improvement over the old system, but when Congressmen and women threaten State with 
budget cuts, it is often because they see the department as using staff and funds ineffectively.187 
Combining and redefining some key bureaus would go a long way toward curbing this criticism. 
(4) New policies face problems when they come up against forces of habit or older, more 
entrenched rules. For example, the post-9/11 era has seen an abundance of legislation and 
discussion about inter-agency information sharing, particularly in the intelligence realm. Still, as 
national security scholar Richard Betts notes, “Now there’s a legal mandate to share information, 
but there’s still countervailing pressure regarding being exposed to classified information on a 
‘need to know’ basis.”188 It should be the responsibility of each Assistant Secretary to make his 
or her bureau accept policy changes. 
(5) Even official documents concede that while diplomatic and strategic efforts to combat Al 
Qaeda have evolved, so has the terrorist organization and others like it. In his writing, terrorism 
expert Bruce Hoffman compares terrorist groups to the archetypal shark in the water, always 
trying to stay one step ahead. Hoffman said in an interview that the federal government is “still 
completely reactive regarding terrorism. We’re very tactical and not very good at 
anticipating.”189 The Obama administration rolled out its National Strategy for Counterterrorism 
in June 2011. Much of the strategy paper is positive and forward-looking, emphasizing the 
successes over the past decade and the sustained commitment to undercutting Al Qaeda’s 
strength and message. The preface recognizes, “Our terrorist adversaries have shown themselves 
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to be agile and adaptive; defeating them requires that we develop and pursue a strategy that is 
even more agile and adaptive.”190 Ironically, the document reads much like the terrorism chapter 
in the 2002 National Security Strategy, published by the Bush White House nine years earlier. 
Although the Bush strategy features more aggressive language on waging a war of ideas and 
destroying terrorist networks, the core definition of Al Qaeda and the plans for combatting it 
remain strikingly similar.191 The overall government’s approach — both at State and on a 
broader level — may not be as agile or adaptive as the White House hopes. 
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Chapter 8: Budget Constraints 
 The greatest limitation on the State Department is its budget, which has been in flux over 
the past decade. The State Authorization Act for the 2001 fiscal year allocated $7.3 billion to the 
agency.192 The total State Department appropriation for fiscal year 2011 was just under $15 
billion — a more than two-fold increase, but one that must be viewed in context. In that same 
time period, the national defense budget increased from $430 billion to over $700 billion.193 
While military expenditures have skyrocketed, economic assistance has not. In the 1970s and 
1980s, foreign aid used to comprise almost two percent of the federal budget, hitting an all-time 
high in 1985. After the Cold War ended, Congress began to put less of a premium on foreign aid. 
The 1990s reductions carried over into the 21st century, and foreign aid today comprises one 
percent of the budget, though it did peak at 1.6 percent in 2004.194 
 Public diplomacy is one of the hardest hit areas within the agency’s budget. In 2011, 
State employed 1,765 people for public diplomacy purposes.195 By contrast, USIA, which 
handled public diplomacy before it merged with the State Department, employed 12,000 people 
at its height in the 1960s, and 6,715 just before the merger in 1997.196 Public diplomacy plans are 
under constant scrutiny because their success can be intangible, and State has to justify each 
project annually to Congress. The 2013 budget requests $10 million more for youth engagement 
than was allocated for 2012, to be shared between the Near Eastern Affairs and South and 
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Central Asian Affairs bureaus.197 Projects with modest costs make sense in an unfavorable 
economic climate, but $10 million is a drop in the bucket compared to what the Pentagon spends. 
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, military operations in those countries cost an estimated 
$383 million and $300 million per day, respectively.198 
 State does intend to significantly increase its counterterrorism expenditures. The 
department spent $3,207,000 in fiscal year 2011. For fiscal year 2013, State requested $19 
million.199 This pales in comparison to what Defense and the CIA spend, but is fitting since 
State’s counterterrorism diplomacy costs less than military and intelligence operations. 
Terrorism expert and Georgetown University professor Bruce Hoffman argues for an even 
greater allocation: “We to ramp up what we spend on counterterrorism diplomacy, especially in a 
time of military cutbacks.”200 He blames Congress and the nature of the American political 
system for the small size of the budget in previous years: “The metrics for the drone program is 
pretty obvious, it’s dead bodies, whereas diplomacy or building capabilities amongst allies is 
much more difficult to measure. It may not be quantifiable in an election cycle.”201 He suggests 
that the White House could do a better job of lobbying Congress and educating the public. 
 Not everyone agrees that State needs a bigger budget. Alvin Felzenberg, the principal 
spokesperson for the 9/11 Commission, says the department should focus on making the most of 
the resources it does have and reforming its system: “[State Department bureaucrats] resist ideas 
from the outside, resist change in entry requirements, stifle creativity, and see their mission as to 
protect mediocre bureaucrats.”202 Republicans in the 112th Congress agree and have consistently 
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threatened to reduce State’s allocation, arguing that certain initiatives are wasteful and 
redundant.203 While perspectives on foreign aid vary based on political allegiance or how one 
sees America’s role in the world, funding for public diplomacy and counterterrorism should not. 
Both of these are in the United States’ immediate national interest, as they not only enhance 
America’s image abroad but also achieve national security goals. Defense and intelligence 
operations are integral to security, but they are also inherently more expensive. Congress and the 
White House should consider which goals could be met through State Department projects, at 
much lower cost to taxpayers. 
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Chapter 9: Implications for Scholarship 
In 1971, legendary diplomat Richard Holbrooke wrote, “The massive foreign affairs 
machine built up during the postwar era rumbles on, as ornate and unwieldy as ever.”204 This 
statement rings equally true today. The territorialism, hierarchical rigidity, inertia, and 
incomplete control, detailed in chapter 3, still plague the State Department. The difference is that 
in the postwar period, scholars concerned themselves with this subject. By contrast, Washington 
scholars today obsess over the military and intelligence communities, at the expense of the 
diplomatic world. The 9/11 Commission identified the same problem as Holbrooke. In a special 
epilogue for the 10th anniversary of September 11th, members of the commission wrote: 
It remains the case today, as in 2004, that the national security institutions of the 
U.S. government were decisively shaped between 1940 and 1960. The last ten 
years have, however, already seen more innovation in them than in any decade 
since the 1950s. Still, it has not gone far enough.205 
 
Simply stated, an apparatus forged during the Truman administration does not have the capacity 
to solve 21st-century problems. 
 Three areas demand particular attention from scholars. First, more research needs to be 
conducted on how the structure of federal agencies impacts their output. Does an ideal structure 
exist? Can bureaucrats self-coordinate or do they always require oversight? In regard to State, 
the literature on these questions dates back to the 1970s. A second area, and one that holds 
particular significance in today’s security environment, is studying how various actors at the 
federal level can coordinate their counterterrorism efforts to maximize results while minimizing 
redundancy and waste. Never before have so many agencies — State, Defense, the CIA, DOJ, 
DHS, and now the newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence — had to 
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coordinate on a top-level project. Ad hoc arrangements will not suffice in this effort. Creating an 
effective, if imperfect, system will require analysis from critical and objective outsiders. Finally, 
scholars and think tank fellows should further investigate the question this thesis poses: what is 
the necessary threshold to achieve dramatic change? State is far from the only agency that suffers 
from bureaucratic maladies. Even an event with the magnitude and long-term ramifications of 
9/11 has not shaken up the department. Would change come from a commission focused 
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Chapter 10: Policy Recommendations 
 Changing an entrenched system is challenging, but after 9/11, the federal government 
should have risen to the occasion. The events described in chapter 4 show that the State 
Department was slow to respond to the threat of Al Qaeda, and those in chapters 5 and 6 reveal 
the ongoing challenges facing the agency. The fault does not lie with the department alone. 
Bureaucracies notoriously resist change, and in the wake of the terrorist attacks, congressional 
and commission attention focused on the intelligence and military communities. They were the 
subjects of hearings and reports. Ultimately, they also received more funding than the State 
Department to cover the new positions and offices created. 
 Unlike major organizations in the private sector, State faces a particular kind of challenge 
because its leadership changes so often. Each new Secretary of State and politically appointed 
Under Secretary proposes his or her own set of reforms. In her memoir, Secretary Rice recalls 
her first impressions of Foggy Bottom when she moved over from being the National Security 
Advisor in 2005. She noted immediately that the “the organization needed to be flatter,” and that 
even simple policy papers took a long time to work their way through the bureaucratic chain of 
command.206 Furthermore, she writes, “The officers we did have were not properly apportioned 
to the tasks at hand. We had nearly as many officers in Germany, which had a population of 80 
million, as in India, which had a population of a billion. That was, in large part, a legacy of the 
Cold War.”207 Seven years later, the department continues to struggle with the Cold War legacy. 
 State’s mission statement reads: “Shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and 
democratic world and foster conditions of stability and progress for the benefit of the American 
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people and people everywhere.”208 For over two centuries, this mission could be achieved 
through bilateral negotiations — the traditional form of international diplomacy. Today, the 
traditional approach does not suffice. The State Department should have responded to 9/11 
earlier and with bolder changes, and to do so, should have been allocated more resources. The 
following four recommendations would improve the department’s operations: 
(1) Reevaluate the importance of regional bureaus. In a world where most problems transcend 
political borders, regional bureaus should not dominate the State Department. While detailed 
knowledge of local issues is vital to State’s policymaking, the functional bureaus that handle 
issues like counterterrorism, arms control, and human rights deserve more staff and resources 
because they deal with big picture, long-term issues every day. 
(2) Appoint several more advisors from outside the Washington bubble who can push creative, 
innovative ideas. State Department advisors Jared Cohen and Alec Ross began this process, but 
some, including 9/11 Commission Spokesperson Alvin Felzenberg, argue that they were not 
given enough support: “I was disappointed to see that [Cohen] received more publicity than did 
his program and I was discouraged to see him leave to take a high paying job with Google before 
his program could be seriously institutionalized and evaluated.”209 As an outside consultant to 
both State and the Pentagon, Felzenberg found the latter to be more receptive to critical advice. 
This does not bode well for State. In the long run, the agency will not reform from the inside, 
through protracted meetings and lengthy memoranda. Three or four well-chosen advisors, in 
addition to a strong Director of Policy Planning, can have a significant impact. 
(3) Commit to more effectively evaluating public diplomacy efforts. Congress will not allocate 
more resources unless it sees results. Public attitudes are difficult to measure, but State should set 
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metrics for their projects, particularly in the Middle East, and publicize the results of public 
opinion polls. Initiatives that succeed and draw national media attention, the way Voice of 
America did during the Cold War, are more likely to secure funding in the future. 
(4) Stake a claim in the fight against terrorism and define it. State can make certain contributions 
through public diplomacy and cultural engagement that other agencies cannot. These efforts 
often go unrecognized by the Washington community and the public at large. Terrorism will 
dominate the public discourse for the foreseeable future, and the agency needs to explain its role 
or risk becoming irrelevant. 
 Transforming State’s bureaucracy will require patience, dedication, and visionary ideas. 
Washington should not have a reason to view the State Department as an agency that stifles 
creativity and values precedence and established rules over innovation. The department has 
much to offer in the realm of international affairs, but only if it can find a way to overcome the 
challenges it faces. 
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Source: Graham Stuart, The Department of State: A History of Its Organizations, Procedure, and Personnel (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 454-5. 
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